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USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 6400

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, UR

SUBJECT: REVISED NATO/IS PAPER ON CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

REF: (A) USNATO 6350 (B) STATE 250537 (C) USNATO 6225

1. MISSION TRANSMITS BELOW CURRENT REVISION OF NATO/IS WORKING PAPER ON CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE. PAPER HAS BEEN AMENDED ALONG LINES REPORTED USNATO 6350. MISSION NOTES ABSENCE, HOWEVER, OF PARENTHETICAL PHRASE (FROM REF C) IN RE-DRAFT OF DISADVANTAGE IV, OPTION C. WE DO NOT PLAN TO RAISE THIS DELETION IN SPC DISCUSSION NOVEMBER 21, BUT ASSUME THAT OTHER DELEGATIONS WILL SEEK TO HAVE LANGUAGE RE-INSERTED.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS DEPARTMENT MIGHT WISH TO MAKE ON REVISED PAPER FOR USE IN NOVEMBER 21 DISCUSSIONS.

BEGIN TEXT.

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1. THE SOVIETS HAVE STRONGLY IMPLIED A CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE BY TELLING THE ALLIES THAT SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF CSCE WOULD SPUR PROGRESS IN MBFR(1). AT THE COUNCIL MEETING ON 2ND OCTOBER, THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES RAISED

THE POSSIBILITY OF TURNING THE TABLES ON THE SOVIET UNION BY ESTABLISHING SUCH A LINK OURSELVES, BUT IN REVERSE FORM, I.E. MAKING PROGRESS IN THE CSCE CONTINGENT UPON EASTERN MOVEMENT IN MBFR.

2. AS AGREED BY THE COUNCIL ON THAT OCCASION, THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE HAS DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT WITH A VIEW TO CLARIFYING THE ISSUES INVOLVED BEFORE FURTHER DEBATE IN THE COUNCIL.

3. THE UNITED STATES INITIATIVE IN PROPOSING THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WAS GENERALLY WELCOMED BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE. THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION; GIVEN THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT DID NOT FAVOUR THE HOLDING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND ACCORDINGLY DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS, IT DID NOT SEE GROUNDS FOR A LINK BETWEEN MBFR AND CSCE. THE FRENCH DELEGATION DID NOT TAKE PART IN THE DRAFTING OF THE SUBSTANTIVE PARAGRAPHS OF THIS PAPER. OTHER DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE APPROPRIATENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF REVERSE LINKAGE AND STRESSED THE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN IMPLEMENTING IT AT THIS TIME.

4. THE SPC'S ANALYSIS OF THE POINTS INVOLVED IS AS FOLLOWS.

(1) MR. GROMYKO IN SPEECH OF 7TH NOVEMBER: "A POSITIVE OUTCOME OF CSCE WILL MAKE THE ATMOSPHERE MORE FAVOURABLE FOR SOLUTION OF OTHER ISSUES INCLUDING MBFR"

BASIC PROBLEMS ARISING FROM NATURE OF NEGOTIATIONS

5. ALTHOUGH INTERRELATED HISTORICALLY, CSCE AND MBFR ARE CHARACTERIZED BY CERTAIN BASIC DIFFERENCES WHICH COMPLICATE
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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LINK:

(A) THE DIFFERENCE IN TIMESCALES. CSCE APPEARS CERTAIN TO END LONG BEFORE MBFR IS COMPLETED, THOUGH A POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT PHASE I OF MBFR COULD BE CONCLUDED AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME AS THE CSCE. IT WOULD BE MOST DIFFICULT TO ENSURE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD, IN THE EVENT, RESPECT ANY AGREEMENT TO PAY A PRICE IN MBFR FOR PROGRESS IN CSCE;

(B) THE DIFFERENCE IN PARTICIPATION BETWEEN THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS; MBFR IS CONFINED TO NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WHILE CSCE INCLUDES NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. THE IDEA OF REVERSE LINKAGE WOULD PROBABLY

BE UNACCEPTABLE TO MANY IF NOT MOST NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED PARTICIPANTS IN THE CSCE, AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION COULD WELL HAVE THE EFFECT OF ALIENATING THEM FROM THE OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS BEING PURSUED IN THE CSCE BY ALLIED GOVERNMENTS;

(C) IN BOTH CSCE AND MBFR, BOTH EAST AND WEST HAVE OBJECTIVES WHICH THEY ARE SEEKING TO ACHIEVE. THE SOVIET UNION IS SEEKING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH ALLIED COUNTRIES ARE THE DEMANDEURS IN MBFR. IN TRYING TO TURN THE TABLES, A PROBLEM IS THAT THE ALLIES ARE ALSO DEMANDEURS IN GENEVA, AND THE SOVIETS ARE CLOSER THAN THE WEST TO ACHIEVING A DEGREE OF SATISFACTION. THEIR REMAINING MAJOR OBJECTIVES APPEAR TO BE CONFIRMATION OF THE TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL STATUS QUO IN EUROPE THROUGH THE HOLDING OF A FINAL PHASE AT SUMMIT LEVEL, A FINAL DOCUMENT IN A FORM ACCEPTABLE TO THEM, AND AGREEMENT TO FOLLOW-UP MEASURES SATISFACTORY FROM THEIR VIEWPOINT. HOW MUCH OF A PRICE THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO PAY FOR ATTAINMENT OF THESE OBJECTIVES IS NOT, HOWEVER, CLEAR.

ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS

6. THE FOLLOWING ARE POSSIBLE OPTIONS WHICH ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. THEY HAVE IN COMMON THAT THEY DO NOT INVOLVE ANY ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN CSCE IN RETURN FOR CONFIDENTIAL

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SOVIET CONCESSIONS IN MBFR.

OPTION A. A SERIES OF BILATERAL DEMARCHES STRESSING THE INEVITABLY INTERDEPENDENT NATURE OF THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS, BUT WITHOUT ANY FORMAL REFERENCE TO REVERSE LINKAGE.

ADVANTAGE

SUCH A STEP COULD BE TAKEN AT ANY TIME AND WOULD COMMIT THE ALLIANCE TO NO PARTICULAR LINE OF ACTION. IT COULD BE A PRELIMINARY TO MORE SPECIFIC MEASURES.

DISADVANTAGES

(I) BECAUSE OF INEVITABLE VARIATIONS IN PRESENTATION OF SEPARATE DEMARCHES, THIS WOULD INVITE SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING. FAILURE BY SOME COUNTRIES TO JOIN IN THE DEMARCHES WOULD FURTHER INCREASE WEDGE-DRIVING.

(II) SUCH DEMARCHES WOULD PUT NO SPECIFIC PRESSURE ON THE WARSAW PACT AND INDEED MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE SOVIET UNION TO PRESS THEIR OWN NOTION OF LINKAGE MORE

STRONGLY.

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OPTION B. SIMILAR ACTION TO "A", BUT CONDUCTED NOT THROUGH BILATERAL APPROACHES, BUT BY SUITABLE WORDING IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL MEETING, WHICH MIGHT REFER BACK APPROPRIATELY TO PARAGRAPH 14 OF THE BONN COMMUNIQUE OF 31ST MAY, 1972, AND PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE BRUSSELS COMMUNIQUE OF 8TH DECEMBER, 1972.

ADVANTAGE

UNLIKE "A" THIS APPROACH WOULD SERVE TO UNDERLINE THE CONSISTENCY OF THE STANCE OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS.

DISADVANTAGES

(I) IT WOULD STILL LEAVE ROOM FOR SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING BETWEEN, ON THE ONE HAND THE NATO PARTICIPANTS AND, ON THE OTHER, THE OTHER NON-WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS.

(II) AS IN DISADVANTAGE (II) TO "A".

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OPTION C. AN INDICATION TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT, UNTIL THERE WAS PROGRESS IN MBFR, THE CSCE DISCUSSIONS, AT PRESENT HELD UP BY SOVIET TACTICS, WOULD BE DELIBERATELY SLOWED DOWN FURTHER BY

ACTION ON THE ALLIED SIDE WHO, BY CONTRAST, HAD TO DATE, BEEN DOING THEIR BEST TO MOVE THE CSCE DISCUSSIONS FORWARD.

ADVANTAGE

IT WOULD PLAY ON SOVIET UNEASE ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF PROTRACTED DISCUSSION OF BASKET III, AS WELL AS ON THEIR DESIRE FOR A RAPID CONCLUSION TO STAGE II AS A WHOLE AND THE EARLY HOLDING OF A FINAL STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

DISADVANTAGES

(I) IT PREMISES READINESS TO SLOW DOWN STAGE II NEGOTIATIONS, PERHAPS IN FACE OF SOVIET BAIT INVITING PROGRESS.

(II) A "SLOW DOWN" IN GENEVA IS UNLIKELY TO RECEIVE THE SUPPORT OF THE NON-NATO AND NON-WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS IN CSCE. IT MAY ALSO BE SUBJECT TO PARLIMENTARY AND PUBLIC CRITICISM IN BOTH NATO AND NETURAL COUNTRIES. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PLAY ON THIS

(III) IN THE EVENT OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE, THE ALLIANCE WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE BOTH WHAT EASTERN CONCESSIONS IN MBFR WOULD BE THOUGHT SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY LETTING OFF THE BRAKE IN GENEVA, AND ALSO, DEPENDING ON HOW THE GENEVA BRAKE HAD BEEN APPLIED, HOW THIS PROCESS SHOULD BE REVERSED. BECAUSE THE CSCE WOULD BE CONCLUDED BEFORE A FINAL MBFR AGREEMENT THERE WOULD BE A PROBLEM OF ENSURING THAT SOVIET CONCESSIONS IN VIENNA WERE RESPECTED AND OF LASTING VALUE.

(IV) THE PRESSURES CREATED WOULD STRAIN ALLIANCE COHESION AND GIVE FRESH OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING AMONG THE ALLIES.

(V) IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE RESOLUTELY TO OPPOSE SUCH A "TRADE-OFF", THERE COULD BE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR DETENTE.

OPTION D. A WARNING TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT, EVEN IF THE RESULTS IN STAGE II OF THE CSCE WERE SATISFACTORY, ALLIED LEADERS, CONFIDENTIAL

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INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, MIGHT NOT FEEL ABLE TO ATTEND IN PERSON THE FINAL STAGE OF THE CSCE IF THERE WERE NOT PROGRESS ACROSS THE WHOLE FIELD OF DETENTE, INCLUDING MBFR.

ADVANTAGES

(I) THIS APPROACH WOULD HIT THE USSR AT A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE SPOT, NAMELY THEIR ATTACHMENT TO A "TOP LEVEL" CONCLUSION OF THE CSCE.

(II) IT WOULD NOT ENTAIL ANY INTERFERENCE WITH THE STRATEGY OF THE ALLIED

COUNTRIES IN THE STAGE II NEGOTIATIONS, WHERE THE ALLIANCE
WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK FOR OPTIMUM RESULTS.

(III) OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING WOULD BE REDUCED.

DISADVANTAGES

(I) THE PROBLEM OF DECIDING ON THE REQUIRED SOVIET QUID PRO QUO IN
MBFR WOULD REMAIN.

(II) IF THE EFFECT WAS TO DELAY OR APPEAR TO JEOPARDIZE THE HOLDING OF

STAGE III, THERE MIGHT BE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE
NETUTRALS AND PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC
OPINION. THE ALLIANCE COULD HOWEVER ANSWER ANY CRITICISM BY
MAKING CLEAR THAT THEY WERE STILL WILLING TO ATTEND A FINAL
STAGE AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL AS ORIGINALLY PREFERRED
BY THEM.

(III) GIVEN THE PREVIOUS POSITIONS OF SOME ALLIED GOVERNMENTS,
THE INTRODUCTION OF PROGRESS IN MBFR AS A CONDITION FOR A HIGH LEVEL
CSCE STAGE III COULD BE DIFFICULT, PARTICULARLY IF THROUGHOUT
STAGE II IT HAD CONTINUED TO BE STATED THAT ALLIED GOVERNMENTS
WOULD BE READY TO GO TO A HIGH LEVEL STAGE III ON CONDITION THAT
THE OUTCOME OF STAGE II WAS SATISFACTORY WITHOUT FURTHER QUALIFICATION.
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7. THE COMMITTEE ALSO CONSIDERED A FURTHER FORM OF REVERSE LINKAGE WHICH WOULD HOWEVER REQUIRE THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE CERTAIN CONCESSIONS IN CSCE. ALTHOUGH LESS ESSENTIAL DESIDERATA COULD BE USED IN THIS CONNECTION, IF IS NONE THE LESS LIKELY THAT SOME HARD CHOICES WOULD BE REQUIRED.

OPTION E. THE ALLIES COULD INDICATE EARLY ON AN INTEREST IN SOVIET REFERENCES TO CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE CONTINGENT ON THE PROVISIO THAT THEY RECEIVED CERTAIN SOVIET ASSURANCES ON MBFR AS A PRECONDITION FOR THE CONCLUSION OF CSCE AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL.

ADVANTAGES

(I) CONCESSIONS MIST BE OBTAINABLE IN MBFR WHICH WOULD NOT BE OBTAINABLE UNDER THE OTHER OPTIONS WHICH ARE LIKELY TO BE LESS ATTRACTIVE TO THE SOVIET UNION.

(II) THE WEST WOULD STAND TO LOSE LITTLE IF THE SOVIETS REJECTED THE WEST'S PRECONDITION FOR SUCH LINKAGE AND COULD GAIN A PSYSHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE.
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DISADVANTAGES

(I) DIFFICULTY OF AGREEMENT OF WHAT CONCESSIONS COULD BE OFFERED IN CSCE. THESE COULD NOT BE IN BASKET III.

(II) DIFFICULT ALLIED DECISIONS WOULD ALSO BE REQUIRED ON WHAT ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN MBFR WERE MOST IMPORTANT AND COULD REALISTICALLY BE EXPECTED TO BE ACHIEVED.

(III) IT COULD MAKE SUBSEQUENT ATTAINMENT OF OTHER ALLIED MBFR DESIDERATA MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE ONCE THE CSCE BARGAINING CHIP WAS EXPENDED.

(IV) COULD, IF THE LINKAGE BECAME STALLED, LEAD TO A STATE OF GENERAL IMMOBILITY AND ADVERSELY AFFECT THE COURSE OF DETENTE.

(V) CSCE NEUTRALS MIGHT FIND LINKAGE OBJECTIONABLE.

SUMMING UP

8. GIVEN THE PREVIOUS POSITION OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS, AND ALSO THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS ITSELF ATTEMPTING TO LINK CSCE AND MBFR, THE DRAFTERS OF THIS PAPER WERE OF THE VIEW THAT IT WAS LEGITIMATE TO CONSIDER REVERSE LINKAGE. IF REVERSE LINKAGE SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING IN MBFR CONCESSIONS NOT OTHERWISE OBTAINABLE, THIS WOULD BE A GAIN. BUT ANY LINKAGE WHICH AFFECTED THE CONDUCT OF STAGE II OF THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD RUN THE RISK OF DEADLOCK, ADVERSE PARLIMENTARY AND PUBLIC

REACTION AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON DETENTE, AS WELL AS THE
DISADVANTAGE IN OPTION E OF MAKING CONCESSIONS IN CSCE. REVERSE
LINKAGE WOULD ALSO OFFER WIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET WEDGE-
DRIVING BY CREATING STARINS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND BY ALIENATING
THE NETURALS AND NON-ALIGNED FROM THE ALLIED CAUSE IN GENEVA.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS TYPE OF PRESSURE ON THE USSR IS NOT
WHOLLY ESTABLISHED. IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT
CIRCUMSTANCES MAY DEVELOP LATER IN THE CSCE AND MBFR NEGOTIATIONS
WHERE THE CONDITIONS FOR ENFORCING "REVERSE LINKAGE" MAY BE MORE
FAVOURABLE THAN AT PRESENT. THE POSSIBILITY IS THERFORE ONE
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TO BE BORNE IN MIND, EVEN IF ACTION IS NOT JUDGED DESIRABLE AT
THIS MOMENT.

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